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Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and Evidence
* 
 
Conventional wisdom depicts corruption as a tax on incumbent firms. This paper challenges 
this view in two ways. First, by arguing that corruption matters not so much because of the 
value of the bribe (“tax”), but because of another less studied feature of corruption, namely 
bribe unavoidability. Second, we argue that the social costs of corruption arise not because 
corruption hurts incumbent firms, but mostly because it acts as a powerful barrier to the entry 
of new firms. Corruption sands and greases in tandem: it helps incumbent firms (on balance) 
and it hurts potential entrants. We put forward a model in which a bureaucrat chooses entry 
barriers to optimize bribe revenues. When the capacity to collect bribes is high, it is optimal to 
allow high levels of oligopoly power to incumbents. Conversely, the more avoidable are the 
bribes, the more firms are allowed into the market. These ideas are tested using a unique, 
representative sample of Brazilian manufacturing firms. Consistently with our theoretical 
model, we show that corruption (a) is ranked as the most important barrier to entry (above 
finance, taxes and regulation) and (b) while bribes’ unavoidability is positively related to firm 
performance, the size of the bribe is not. 
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Capitalism takes no prisoners and kills
competition when it can ￿Vince Cable MP
There is a large literature on the causes and e⁄ects of corruption, surveyed for
example in Bardhan (1997), Aidt (2003, 2009), Svensson (2005), Treisman (2007)
and Pande (2008). Corruption is normally conceived as having a negative e⁄ect on
economic performance. For instance, Mauro (1995) views it as a tax on investment
while Goulder et al (1997) suggest bribes may substitute for taxes, thereby reduc-
ing public service provision. It is also sometimes argued that bribery "greases the
wheels of growth", i.e. it partially addresses ine¢ ciencies created by government in-
tervention (Le⁄, 1964; Lui, 1985; Meon and Sekkat, 2005) although the econometric
evidence supporting a negative e⁄ect is overwhelming. The empirical literature iden-
ti￿es signi￿cant strong negative relationships between corruption,on the one hand,
and income, growth and democracy, on the other (Paldan, 2002; Rose-Ackerman,
1998; Mauro, 1995). However, the exact mechanisms through which the harmful
e⁄ect of corruption operate on enterprise and national economic performance are still
not well understood.
In this paper, we propose and provide supporting evidence for a mechanism that
has received little attention so far in the literature, namely that corruption represents
an important barrier for new ￿rms, thereby harmfully enhancing the monopoly power
and rents earned by incumbent ￿rms.1 Following the seminal work of de Soto on
legal barriers to entrepreneurship (de Soto, 1990), considerable research has gone into
understanding and measuring entry barriers (Djankov et al, 2002) and corruption
(Kaufman et al, 2005). This paper takes the analysis a step forward by endogenizing
these barriers; in particular we show that when there are little chance of avoiding to
pay the bribe and when the bribe collection happens regularly and frequently, namely
when the corruption system is e⁄ective, incumbent ￿rms tend to perform better. This
happens because a pro￿t maximizing bureaucrat will prefer in this case to give more
oligopoly power to incumbent ￿rms by allowing fewer new ￿rms into the market. On
the other hand, in a system where actors have a good chance to avoid paying bribes,
a bureaucrat will prefer to share the risk across ￿rms and will allow more ￿rms into
the market. Our model formalises these notions.
The notion that the level of entry barriers represented by corruption is endoge-
nously determined is a crucial step forward in the general debate on whether cor-
ruption is a mechanism that "greases" or "sands" the wheels of growth. Our model
1The literature recognises the important role that new ￿rm entry plays in disseminating informa-
tion (Acs, 2006) and in transferring resources from low to high value uses (Bertelsman, Haltiwanger
and Scarpetta, 2004). Moreover, entry is identi￿ed as of particular importance to the development
process in e g. Tybout (2000) and the literature has associated cross-country variation in entry rates
with the institutional context, including corruption (e.g. Klapper, Laeven, Rajan, 2006).
2shows how corruption can be both a "wheel greaser" for incumbent ￿rm and a "wheel
sander", for a potential entrant; and that corruption sands the wheels in order to
be able to grease the wheels. The implication is that the negative e⁄ect should be
judged on the basis of the failure to create an optimal level of competition, which
is consistent with most of the literature identifying a negative association between
corruption and income (Paldam, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1998).
The positive relationship between pro￿ts and corruption has been emphasized by
Johnson, McMillan and Woodru⁄(2002) and Shleifer and Vishy (2003). There are as
yet no empirical studies related to bribe variability and avoidability though a recent
theoretical paper by Aidt and Dutta (2008) is linked to ours in that they show how
democratic politicians have an incentive to create barriers to entry for new ￿rms via
corruption. There are also parallels with Barron and Olken (2009) which analyzes
how market forces shapes the mechanism of corruption, as in the present paper, they
emphasize an economic rationale behind the mechanisms of bribe formation. The
e⁄ect of market forces on corruption is also analyzed in Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and
Aides and Di Tella (1999), where the causal link goes from market competition to
corruption, rather than the converse as in the present paper.2
Using our dataset we test these predictions showing that the bribe avoidability
is signi￿cantly and negatively related to the performance of incumbent ￿rms. Also
consistently with the model, we ￿nd that in markets where bribes are perceived as
more unavoidable, the age of the ￿rm is negatively correlated with performance, as we
would expect in protected markets in which older and more technologically obsolete
￿rms thrive.
The dataset developed for this paper is unique in at least three ways.3 Firstly, the
survey comprises questions which are speci￿cally about ￿rm entry and not exclusively
about ￿rm growth. Secondly, the questionnaire was applied to domestic industrial
￿rms, not to foreign investors, or legal specialists or lawyers.4 Thirdly, the survey
asks not only which are the main obstacles to entry, but also provides an extensive
characterization of each. Thus it goes beyond assessing how important an obstacle
corruption is to potential entrants to enquire in addition about which aspects of
corruption are deemed more or less signi￿cant. For example, it contains information
about the relative impact of the size of the average bribe against the uncertainty
surrounding the need to pay. There is now a literature on regulatory barriers to entry
in developing countries based on survey evidence (e.g. Moreira, 1999, Djankov et
2There is ￿nally a large literature on property rights and corruption in incomplete information
framework Rose-Ackerman (1975), Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1994), Carrillo
(1996), Banerjee (1997), Hindriks et al. (1998), Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) among others.
3The survey was conducetd by a established, well-known private consultancy ￿rm in Brazil.
Datametrica (at www.datametrica.com.br) has branches and teams throughout the country and
specialises in large dedicated surveys to international organisations, and to large private and public
￿rms. We provide further details of this survey in section 3 below.
4Although for many issues this may be an inconsequential distinction, that does not seem to be
the case when measuring corrution, as shown by Raza￿ndrakoto and Roubaud (2010).
3al., 2002; Svensson, 2003; Aterido et al., 2007; ). Most of the existing work assumes
that (a) the factors determining the performance of industrial ￿rms coincide with
those that impede the entrance of new ￿rms5 and (b) that this information can
be reliably obtained from foreign investors and/or lawyers.6 Our research strategy
di⁄ers from these previous e⁄orts in that we ask incumbent ￿rms what they consider
to be the obstacles or barriers that are most severe to potential entrants. Ours is,
to the best of our knowledge, the only survey that asks "which factor is the most
important constraint to a new ￿rm that is considering to start production (entry) in
your industrial sector?"
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the theoretical
model. Section 3 presents the dedicated survey we carried out for this paper. Section
4 analyses the most salient data issues. Our data show that corruption is often
ranked as the most important barrier to entry (more important than ￿nance, taxes
and regulation) and unavoidability is positively associated with ￿rm performance.
Section 5 presents the econometric results and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Theoretical framework
We present here a simple model, showing how uncertainty in the capacity of the
corruptor to collect the bribe and/or the possibility for the ￿rm to avoid paying the
bribe is not necessarily good for the incumbent ￿rm itself and might actually result
in lower pro￿tability.
There is a market with N identical potential risk neutral ￿rms, and a risk averse
bureaucrat, with utility u(x), where u
0 > 0 > u
00 who determines the number of
￿rms,n, permitted to enter the market.7
5In our survey, 70% of the respondents claim that corruption is a major obstacle to ￿rm entry
while only about 30% claim that corruption was a major obstacle to ￿rm growth in 2000. This
suggests a stark distinction between how incumbent ￿rms view the role of corruption with respect
to growth and entry. Corruption is crucial as a mechanism to deter entry of new competitors but
only of marginal signi￿cance with respect to the operation and growth of incumbent ￿rms.
6Thus, the surveys upon which these papers are based are directed either to foreign investors
(because they would be able to compare these barriers with those in their countries of origin) or to
law ￿rms in developing countries (because they possess detailed knowledge of such barriers). While
both are valuable ways of collecting information, they also have weaknesses. Foreign investors are
not subject to the same set of constraints, ￿nance for example, as domestic ￿rms and lawyers know
more about de jure than de facto barriers.
7The fact that there is only one bureaucrat with the power of allowing the ￿rm in a market
is somewhat simplistic. In reality the ￿rm has to face permissions from di⁄erent bodies. However,
assuming that there are more than one bureaucrat to seek permission for would not change or results
as long as the burocrats are not competimg among each other; i.e. if each of them has the monopoly
on one particular concession.
4Assume that each ￿rm faces a linear market demand for the good supplied, with
an inverse function




and each ￿rm i, produces yi at the cost cyi. Firms in the market are assumed to
produce in Cournot oligopoly and each maximize
￿(n) = max
yi
p(y1;::yi;::;yn)yi ￿ cyi: (1)
Recalling that ￿rms are symmetric and de￿ning ￿ y as the quantity produced by





1 ￿ c ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿ y
2
: (2)
After production, the bureaucrat is able to extract a proportion of the pro￿t as
a bribe. This depends on each ￿rm￿ s and bureaucrat￿ s bargaining power, which we
assume to be uncertain ex-ante. As a result the bribe, in terms of share of pro￿ts, is
represented by a random discrete variable, ￿; we assume that this can be "high"; ￿ ￿,
with probability (1 ￿ q) or "low", ￿, with probability q, with ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ 0 and q > 0:
The probability q is a measure of the avoidability. of paying the bribe, hence q is
also a measure of the e⁄ectiveness of the bribery system.
We then summarize the timing of the game is as follows:
1. The bureaucrat decides n ￿ N
2. The incumbent ￿rm i produce yi
3. The level of ￿ is known
4. The bribe is paid.
2.1 Equilibrium
From 2, by solving the equation yr























n￿iu((i￿ + (n ￿ i)￿)￿(n)); (5)
and s/he will choose n to maximize B(n).
Using the bureaucrat objective function (5), we will argue that the optimal number
of incumbent ￿rms;n￿; is non-decreasing in uncertainty q: In the case of a risk-neutral




n qn (￿ (1 ￿ q) + ￿q)
(1 + n)
2 ;
which is monotonically decreasing in n for n > 1.8 Therefore a risk-neutral bureaucrat
will always prefer a monopoly, n￿ = 1 for any level of q. An in￿nitely risk-averse
bureaucrat would only care about the worst state of the world, i.e. when he can only
collect ￿ from every ￿rm and so will seek the maximum level of diversi￿cation with
n = N:9 A moderately risk-averse bureaucrat would prefer to diversify risk to some
extent, so possibly n < N. In this case, the higher is q, the greater will be the number
of ￿rms with which the bureaucrat prefers to deal. From the expression (4), we can
see the the pro￿ts of the incumbent ￿rms are decreasing with the number of the ￿rms
in the market, n:Hence, a higher level of uncertainty q in the bribe collection will
result in a lower level of pro￿ts, before the bribe, for the ￿rm. We present below an
example with N = 2, to show that the net e⁄ect of the lower pro￿ts and the higher
bribe, may result in a lower level of ￿rm pro￿ts after the bribes.
2.2 A Two Firm Example
In order to have a closed solution and to analyze the net e⁄ect of bribes on the
industrial organization and ￿rms￿pro￿ts, we simplify the model by assuming that
potential entrants N = 2. Moreover, for expositional simplicity, we assume that the
utility function for the bureaucrat is u(x) =
p
x and ￿ = 0:









8Its derivative with respect to n can be written in the form g(c;q;n)(1 ￿ n), where g(c;q;n) is a
strictly positive function.











Figure 1: Firms Pro￿ts and Bribe Avoidability






The expected utility for a bureaucrat when n = 2; is









while for n = 1;











Accordingly if uncertainty about the bribe increases (i.e. q increases) the bureau-
crat prefers to let the second ￿rm enter the market. The expected pro￿ts after bribe
for the ￿rm, ^ ￿
e; are characterized by the following function
^ ￿
e(q) =
((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿) + q)￿
4 q < ￿ q (where n = 1)
((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿) + q)￿
9 q > ￿ q (where n = 2) :
Figure 1, plots the after-bribe expected pro￿ts against bribe uncertainty. We
note that pro￿ts when uncertainty is low (q < ￿ q) are generally higher than when the
uncertainty is high (this is always true whenever ￿ < 5
9).
Finally notice that when, as in this last example, ￿ = 0, we can interpret 1￿q as a
measure of the bribes￿frequency, so that we can argue that with high bribe frequency
(when q is close to 0) it is plausible to expect high pro￿ts.
To summarize the ￿ndings of this model we have:
7￿ Post-bribe pro￿ts will decrease with bribe uncertainty or avoidability
￿ Post-bribe pro￿ts will increase with bribe frequency
We can summarize the above points by saying that a more e⁄ective system of
corruption will ensure higher post-bribe pro￿ts to the ￿rm. This is one way in which
corruption can work as an e⁄ective barrier to the creation and survival of new ￿rms. In
the next section, we will provide empirical evidence in support of these propositions.
3 Data collection
The two main objectives of this section are to present the survey and sampling design
and to provide details on the sample representativeness.
The dataset contains unique survey information collected through face-to-face
interviews with CEOs of a representative sample of ￿rms operating in large emerging
market (Brazil.) The survey was undertaken by a private ￿rm10, and comprised
interviews with the CEOs of 98 ￿rms; 28 from the consumer electronics sector and
70 from the textile sector. The interviews were carried out between December 2004
and July 2005 and lasted an average of 90 minutes. The sample was designed to
be representative of the two sectors in terms of ￿rm size (number of employees as
well as revenue.) There was also concern about the spatial distribution, driven by the
expectation that those located in the richer Southeast region would bene￿t from better
physical and service infrastructure and other sources of agglomeration economies. As
a consequence, the sampling procedure followed the distribution by region and ￿rm
size of the Labor Ministry￿ s RAIS (a dataset containing all registered, that is formal,
￿rms in the country).
Previous studies have usually been carried out at the country level. One important
reason for focusing on individual manufacturing sectors is that this identi￿es the pre-
cise industries in consideration when asking about entry. The choice of sectors is very
important. One main consideration was to try to focus on two manufacturing sectors
that were di⁄erent in terms of their technological base but whose ￿rms tend to use
production technologies that are similarly mature in the sense that these technologies
would present barriers to entry of similar nature and magnitude. With this in mind,
two sectors were selected at ISIC 3-digit level: within industry code 17 ("manufacture
of textiles") and industry code 32 ("manufacture of radio, television and communica-
tion equipment"), ￿rms were sampled from those operating in sector 17.1 ("spinning,
weaving and ￿nishing of textiles") or in sector 32.3 ("manufacture of television and
radio receivers, sound or video recording.") These two sectors (hereafter "textiles"
and "consumer electronics," respectively) were chosen because they are both impor-
tant within their two-digit sectors (in shares in output and employment) and they are
10More information at Datametrica (at www.datametrica.com.br)
8both capital intensive, relatively concentrated, and technologically mature. Further,
￿nal users include both industrial ￿rms and households. Finally, and no less impor-
tantly, in these two industries the importance of informal sector considerations seems
satisfactorily remote. Because RAIS preserves the anonymity of the ￿rms, once the
sectors were selected, a representative sample of ￿rms was drawn from a ￿rm (not
plant) register at the main industrialists￿association in Brazil (FIESP).
The average textile ￿rm in the sample employed 73 full-time workers in 2005,
which is close to the corresponding ￿gure for the population of about 64 employees
in the 2002 RAIS data. The textile ￿rms in the sample export on average 15% of the
value of their output, compared to 11% in the population. In terms of destination of
these exports, more than 75% of them are for Mercosul countries, mostly to Argentina,
by far the largest destination market. The average age of the ￿rms in the sample is
approximately 29 years, raging from 3 to 133 years of continuous operation (see Table
1). The average electronics ￿rm in the sample employed approximately 80 full-time
workers in 2005, somewhat below the population average for 2002 of about 130. The
￿rms in the sample exported approximately 10% of their output, compared to 8%
in the population. Although a larger average share of output is exported in textiles
than in electronics, the percentage of ￿rms that are involved in exporting activities is
higher in electronics than textiles. Finally, about 20% of the electronics ￿rms in the
sample have some foreign ownership, against below 5% for textiles. These ￿gures are
similar to data from the late 1990s (Moreira, 1999).
4 Data analysis
What are the main lessons one learns from these new data? One of the central
questions of the survey is about predominant barriers to entry. CEOs were presented
with a list of potential factors and asked to identify which was the most important
entry barrier at the time of the survey as well as 5 and 10 years before (i.e., for
years 2005, 2000 and 1995 respectively). As shown in Table 2, the list of factors is
exhaustive and includes the availability of ￿nance, corruption, quality of the transport
and communications infrastructure, and taxation. Table 2 displays a summary of
survey responses. The main ￿nding is that approximately 70 percent of the ￿rms
in the sample identi￿ed corruption as the most important barrier to a ￿rm that was
considering entry in year 2005. The relevant ￿gures for years 2000 and 1995 are not
very di⁄erent from the ones for 2005 suggesting that CEOs not only view corruption
as the main barrier to entry, but also that they see it as persistent, remaining the
most important barrier to entry during the previous ten years. Also notice that
the importance attached to corruption seems to have varied little between 1995 and
2005. This is even more remarkable in light of the substantial changes in the relative
importance of other factors that our surveys depicts: focusing on the top 5 factors,
since 1995 the relative importance of two decreased (policy uncertainty and lack
9of skilled labour), while the relative importance of the other two factors increased
(￿nance and taxes). It should also be mentioned that interviewed were presented
with a list of 15 factors with corruption listed as item number 9 (it was placed about
the middle of the list, rather than at the beginning or the end).
Are barriers to the growth of incumbent ￿rms di⁄erent from barriers to the entry
of new ￿rms? Over the last ten years, there has been a rapid expansion of ￿rm-level
survey evidence on barriers to growth and since the focus of such surveys was the
"climate for investment" and "di¢ culties in doing business", the overlap between the
two sets of barriers was implied. However, whether or not they are the same is an
empirical question. In this respect it is instructive to compare the responses to our
survey to ￿rm-level survey The World Bank conducted in 1999 (an Investment Climate
Assessment) covering 201 Brazilian ￿rms.11 The type of question in the surveys is
similar and there is one question that almost perfectly overlaps, asking whether or
not the ￿rm perceives a series of factors as a major obstacle to growth. Figure 1
contrasts the results from the two surveys (we report the answers for year 2000 for
barriers to entry so as to make it more easily comparable to the World Bank data). It
shows that taxes and regulations are perceived by CEOs to be the major obstacle to
operation and growth of ￿rms in Brazil in the late 1990s with 71.6% of them arguing
that this item is a major obstacle. The second most important factor is the instability
and uncertainty surrounding government policy, followed by exchange rate instability,
crime and public safety matters, and availability of ￿nance. Only about 30% of the
respondents claim that corruption was a major obstacle to ￿rm growth in 2000, while
about 70% of the ￿rms in our survey claim that corruption is a major obstacle to ￿rm
entry12. This suggests a stark distinction between how incumbent ￿rms view the role
of corruption with respect to growth and entry. Corruption is crucial as a mechanism
to deter entry of new competitors but only of marginal signi￿cance with respect to
the operation and growth of incumbent ￿rms. This suggests that incumbent ￿rms
support a stark distinction on the e⁄ectiveness with which corruption plays a role.
The questionnaire permits a ￿ne characterization of the economic mechanisms
triggered by corruption, it contains further questions on three dimensions of corrup-
tion: the size of the bribe (how much it would cost to the ￿rm in management time
and in monetary terms), the frequency of the bribe, and the avoidability. of the
bribe.13 The bottom panel of Table 1 presents the relevant statistics. The average
11Two important di⁄erences that should be kept in mind when comapring these two sets of re-
ponses are that The World Bank sample is larger than ours and it includes ￿rms from all industrial
and service sectors.
12Figure 1 shows comparable information between our data set and the World Bank survey. It
refers to "among these barriers, which one is the major obstacle?" Table 2 presents answers to a
di⁄erent question, namely "which is the most important barrier at the time of the survey, as well
as 5 and 10 years before?" The latter information is not available in the World Bank data so it is
impossible to directly compare ours to it.
13The question on "avoidability" was phrased: "how often is it true that if a public o¢ cial act in
an irregular manner, your ￿rm can contact his or her superior (or another public o¢ cial) and receive
10size of the bribe, expressed as the percentage of a public contract that needs to be of-
fered as an extra-o¢ cial payment in order to guarantee that the contract is awarded,
ranges from 0 to 30% and averages just above 2%. In terms of the percentage of
time from a senior manager that needs to be dedicated to dealing with public o¢ cials
about the "application and interpretation of laws and regulations," the average ￿rm
in the sample spends more than 30% of working time annually.14 In terms of bribe
avoidability., 88% of the answers indicate that bribes can rarely be avoided and in
more than 50% of the cases, the value of the bribe it is not known in advance.15
A ￿nal interesting question concerns how these various dimensions of corruption
relate to each other. There is nothing surprising in the pattern of correlations among
￿rm characteristics: older ￿rms are more likely to be large, export more, and have
some degree of foreign ownership. More interesting is that most of these features
the correct treatment, without having to make any extra-o¢ cial payments?" The question about
bribe uncertainty was phrased: "how often is it true that ￿rms in your industry know in advance
exactly how much the necessary extra-o¢ cial payments will be?" Both set of answers were coded on
a 1 ("always") to 6 ("never") scale.
14When asked about the exact monetary values of bribes for each of these items, the majority
of respondents declined to answer. This is in part because the interviewees were invariably CEOs
and these bribes are dealt with by di⁄erent parts of the ￿rm (telephone, taxes, licenses, imports,
government contracts and general legal issues).
15Regarding bribe frequency, it ranges from about 5% of the ￿rms having to pay bribes for elec-
tricity and telephone services, to almost 20% of them having to bribe to guarantee a government
contract.
11are not systematically related to the various corruption characteristics - bribe size,
frequency and uncertainty - with the exception of foreign-owned ￿rms (which seem less
likely to pay bribes and be often asked for bribes.) The pair-wise correlations between
bribe magnitude and avoidability. are low. At the lower end, .02 is the correlation
between bribe value uncertainty and percentage of the government contract paid
as bribe, while at the other extreme, 30 is the correlation between percentage of
government contract and share of managerial time spent dealing with public o¢ cials.
The correlations between frequency and avoidability. features are similarly low (all at
or below .3): reassuringly they tend to be negative between frequency and uncertainty.
Thus, the less frequent the bribe, the less certain the ￿rm is about its value but the
correlation between frequency and avoidability. is positive, implying that the less
often bribes are demanded, the more it is that likely they can be avoided. The pair-
wise correlations between bribe cost in terms of management time and bribe frequency
tends to be very low (all below .15) but that is not the case for those between bribe
frequency and share of government contract. They range, in the latter case, from a
lowest value of .03 for electricity and phone services to a highest value of -.44 for taxes,
this being above -.3 for licences and dealings with the judiciary. Finally, it should be
noted that although the correlation between the two measures of avoidability. and
magnitude tend to be low, respectively (-.22 and 0.8), the same is not true for the
correlation among some bribe frequency measures. In particular, it is above .5 for the
correlation between the frequency of bribes for dealings with the judiciary, and for
dealings regarding taxes and import licenses. Also above .5 is the simple correlation
between bribe frequency for taxes and that for licenses (.68)
5 Econometric results
The objective of this section is to report the econometric ￿ndings concerning the
e⁄ects of di⁄erent aspects of corruption (bribe magnitude, frequency and avoidabil-
ity.) on ￿rm performance. The theoretical framework and the empirical evidence
presented above suggest some hypothesis concerning the relationship between ￿rm
performance and corruption. If corruption is indeed an e⁄ective barrier that deters
potential entrants, we would expect it to generate rents to incumbents. A sounder
system of corruption will be associated with higher barriers, and therefore greater
rents, potentially trickling down to incumbent ￿rms in terms of pro￿ts, sales, and
employment.
Our preferred measure of ￿rm performance is job creation or employment growth.
The careful choice of industrial sectors (￿rms operating in the more mature technology
and formal sectors of the textiles and electronics industries) underlies employment
growth as a reliable and comparable measure of performance. Moreover, measurement
error is potentially reduced by focusing on growth of employment rather than value
added or productivity (see Alterido et al., 2007, Fisman and Svensson, 2007). This
12choice is also partly justi￿ed on the basis of data constraints. Firms were informed
that they were being sampled on the basis of their size (number of workers), so
they felt at ease in disclosing this information, but less so with output, sales, capital,
advertising and research and development expenditures. For example, 97 respondents
disclosed the number of full time workers in 2005 while only 65 did the same for the
value of output. This maps into having only 45 observations if output is used instead
of employment in the bribe unavoidability speci￿cation below.
We therefore assess the e⁄ect of corruption on job creation, using as dependant
variables the rate of change of employment from 2000 to 2005. In table 2, we describe
the main variables used in the subsequent analysis. In table 3 we present the baseline
model where job creation is regressed against a set of variables re￿ ecting various
di⁄erent corruption features, namely frequency, uncertainty and magnitude of bribes.
The set of controls include: initial size (number of full time workers in 2000), a
dummy variable for industrial sector (which takes the value of 1 for textile ￿rms, and
zero for electronics), the age of the ￿rm (in years since starting operation in one of
these two sectors), whether or not the ￿rm is foreign-owned, exports, and supplies
the government.
Table 3 shows that the coe¢ cient on bribe unavoidability is positive and signi￿cant
while the coe¢ cient on bribe uncertainty is negative and nearly signi￿cant at the 5%
level. As we saw in the model above, bribe unavoidability and certainty may well be
positively related to performance. The model shows that this is an indirect e⁄ect of
the capacity of levying bribes on ￿rms, this capacity can result in a higher barrier to
entry, in a smaller number of ￿rms in the market and in higher pro￿t for the ￿rms.
In contrast, Table 3 also shows that the magnitude of the bribe is not signi￿cantly
related to ￿rm performance, and this seems to be consistent with the hypothesis in
our model that bribes are a ￿xed percentage of the pro￿ts but independent from the
level of pro￿ts.
Table 4 displays the e⁄ect of frequency of the bribe on ￿rms￿outcome; in particular
we show this e⁄ect for di⁄erent sources of bribes. In 3 out of 6 cases this e⁄ect
is positive and highly signi￿cant (Licence, Taxes, Judiciary); in one it is positive
but not signi￿cant (Custom), and in the other two cases the sign is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This suggests a positive link between frequency and
￿rms￿performance. As we saw, the e⁄ect of frequency on performance can also be
explained on the basis of our model; frequency reveals a higher e⁄ectiveness of the
system in levying bribe and as a result fewer ￿rms will be allowed into the market.
Moreover, as it can be seen from all speci￿cations in tables 3 and 4, there are
signi￿cant di⁄erences according to whether or not a ￿rm is a government supplier
(those that sell to the government tend to have worse performances). There seem
to be no signi￿cant di⁄erences in terms of performance emanating from industrial
sector, foreign ownership or exporting behavior. The coe¢ cient on ￿rm size is only
13signi￿cant at the 15% level.16
In the baseline results, ￿rm age is shown to be negatively related to performance
suggesting that older ￿rms may experience lower rates of employment growth, con-
trolling for initial size. It might also be due to technological leapfrogging that newer
￿rms enjoy. This ￿nding is consistent with the life-cycle view of ￿rm growth (Evans,
1987). Thus it is possible to argue that the fact that older and less e¢ cient ￿rms
are still on the market could be a signal of the presence of protection and barriers
to entry. It is therefore instructive to investigate further this issue to assess how the
baseline results behave when accounting for the interactions between ￿rm age and
each individual corruption feature. Table 5 shows the baseline results, with the in-
troduction of the interaction term between bribe uncertainty in unavoidability and
magnitude with ￿rm age. Interesting, from the column 1, we note that the terms
interacting bribe unavoidability and age is positive and signi￿cant, and the term ￿rm
age becomes non-signi￿cant and actually changes its sign. This suggests that the age
e⁄ect is only important for by ￿rms for which the bribe is more unavoidable. In other
words, older ￿rms are less pro￿table only when an e⁄ective corruption system￿i.e.
a system where the bribe cannot be avoided￿protects the incumbent ￿rm from the
competition.17 Table 6 shows the baseline results with interactions of bribe uncer-
tainty and bribe magnitude with ￿rm age. The main message is that the absence
of bribe avoidability. seems to be the crucial feature, and more important than the
uncertainty surrounding the value of the bribe, be it in terms of management time or
in percentage of a government contract.18
6 Conclusions
This paper argues that an important, but to a large extent, ignored harmful e⁄ect of
corruption is as a barrier to the creation of new ￿rms. As such, corruption reduces
the threat of potential competition. We present a simple model that articulates these
ideas. In particular, it highlights that somewhat neglected aspects of corruption
(namely bribe unavoidability and bribe uncertainty) may have ￿rst-order e⁄ects on
the economic performance of ￿rms. Our empirical evidence shows that incumbent
16To explore whether multicollinearity may be behind such result, we run the same speci￿cations
excluding the variables more highly correlated with size, namely age and export propensity. It is
interesting to note that the exclusion of age seems to have little e⁄ect on the coe¢ cient on ￿rm size,
while the exclusion of export propensity tends to make it statistically signi￿cant at conventional
levels.These are available upon request.
17The e⁄ect of taxes and of licences/permits on performance vanishes with the inclusion of the
respective interactions, but this seems to be an e⁄ect of multicollinearity.
18We have also tried to evaluate the robustness of the results above through instrumental variables.
It was di¢ cult, as usual, to ￿nd good instruments. Yet, we do ￿nd that with regional dummies and
the excluded corruption features as instruments, all the results discussed above remain. These results
are available upon request.
14￿rms, when asked about the relative importance of various barriers to entry, identify
corruption as the most important one. We also ￿nd that di⁄erent features of bribing
activity are strongly associated with ￿rm performance; in particular that frequency
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17Table 1: Basic statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Empl. Growth 0.085 0.692 -1.427 3.091 90
Sector (textiles=1) 0.714 0.454 0 1 98
Firm Age 29.67 28.146 3 133 97
Foreign owned (yes=1) 0.188 0.392 0 1 96
Exporter (yes=1) 0.24 0.429 0 1 96
Govern. supplier (yes=1) 0.337 0.475 0 1 95
Initial ￿rm size (FT, in log) 3.642 2.083 0 9.903 95
Bribe unavoidability 4.974 1.556 1 7 77
Bribes￿value uncertainty 3.124 2.131 1 7 89
Bribe frequency regarding
Phone/electricity 0.042 0.201 0 7 96
Licenses and permits 0.219 0.784 0 7 96
Taxes 0.156 0.759 0 7 96
Government contracts 0.258 0.806 0 7 93
Customs 0.987 2.338 0 7 78
Judiciary 0.354 1.414 0 7 96
Bribe magnitude regarding
Management time 37.809 33.816 0 100 89
Percentage of contract 2.195 4.564 0 30 82
18Table 2: Percentage of ￿rms that identi￿ed the factor as the
most important barrier to a ￿rm that is considering to start




Corruption 30.93 32.63 34.18
Finance 21.65 18.95 13.92
Taxes 14.30 11.58 10.12
Policy uncertainty 9.28 10.53 16.45
Lack of skilled labour 7.22 8.42 8.86
Non-competitive practices 5.15 6.32 5.06
Crime 3.09 2.11 1.27
Infrastructure 2.06 2.11 2.53
Regulations 2.06 1.05 1.27
Organized crime (ma￿a) 2.06 2.11 1.27
Exchange rate instability 1.03 2.11 2.53
Judiciary 1.02 1.05 1.27
Total 99.85 98.97 98.73
Source: Authors￿calculations.
Columns do no add to 100% because of rounding
19Table 3: E⁄ect of Bribe Magnitude and Unavoidability on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector (textiles=1) -0.158 -0.184 0.0276 -0.291
(0.168) (0.232) (0.142) (0.219)
Firm Age -0.0100** -0.0104*** -0.00810*** -0.0162***
(0.00429) (0.00392) (0.00290) (0.00536)
Foreign owned (yes=1) 0.302 -0.0279 -0.0305 -0.204
(0.200) (0.186) (0.178) (0.265)
Exporter (yes=1) -0.0533 -0.00621 -0.141 -0.156
(0.227) (0.266) (0.216) (0.276)
Govern. supplier (yes=1) -0.275* -0.310 -0.0880 -0.462**
(0.151) (0.205) (0.123) (0.204)
Initial ￿rm size (FT, in log) 0.0681 0.120 0.113 0.168*





Bribe magnitude in terms of:
Management time 0.00418
(0.00306)
Percentage of contract 0.0109
(0.0150)
Constant -0.253 0.367 -0.231 0.318
(0.289) (0.286) (0.273) (0.283)
Observations 67 77 77 71
R2 0.202 0.205 0.169 0.237
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20Table 4: E⁄ect of Bribes￿Frequency on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sector -0.241 -0.251 -0.243 -0.266 -0.413 -0.310
(textiles=1) (0.213) (0.212) (0.212) (0.213) (0.272) (0.216)
Firm Age -0.0110*** -0.0112*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** -0.00927** -0.0107***
(0.00398) (0.00396) (0.00395) (0.00406) (0.00439) (0.00395)
Foreign owned -0.00124 -0.0505 -0.0342 -0.0276 -0.238 -0.0387
(yes=1) (0.208) (0.172) (0.171) (0.210) (0.300) (0.177)
Exporter -0.0170 -0.0247 -0.0138 -0.0421 0.0282 -0.0506
(yes=1) (0.266) (0.263) (0.264) (0.293) (0.272) (0.263)
Governmnent -0.374* -0.372* -0.369* -0.364* -0.539** -0.403**
supplier (yes=1) (0.195) (0.193) (0.194) (0.207) (0.249) (0.194)
Initial ￿rm size 0.110 0.118 0.114 0.125 0.132 0.130*














Constant 0.317 0.286 0.295 0.263 0.296 0.275
(0.279) (0.274) (0.274) (0.270) (0.338) (0.270)
Observations 83 83 83 80 69 83
R2 0.177 0.189 0.185 0.183 0.217 0.206
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
21Table 5: Age Interactions and The Impact of the Bribe Unavoidability
on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector (textiles=1) -0.160 -0.175 0.0235 -0.362
(0.178) (0.238) (0.144) (0.233)
Firm Age 0.00243 -0.0115** -0.00619 -0.0129**
(0.00436) (0.00521) (0.00390) (0.00549)
Foreign owned (yes=1) 0.288 -0.0163 -0.00270 -0.307
(0.196) (0.197) (0.168) (0.304)
Exporter (yes=1) -0.107 -0.00461 -0.143 -0.169
(0.234) (0.266) (0.217) (0.279)
Govern. supplier (yes=1) -0.249 -0.293 -0.0784 -0.500**
(0.164) (0.217) (0.125) (0.211)
Initial ￿rm size (FT, in log) 0.0786 0.118 0.111 0.171*





Bribe magnitude in terms of:
Management time 0.00553
(0.00471)
Percentage of contract 0.104
(0.0869)
Interaction age and -0.00264** 0.000414 -6.05e-05 -0.00172
Bribe features (0.00115) (0.00121) (9.89e-05) (0.00155)
Constant -0.729** 0.391 -0.277 0.224
(0.355) (0.300) (0.308) (0.295)
Observations 67 77 77 71
R2 0.234 0.205 0.173 0.246
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
22Table 6: Interactions and The Impact of the Bribe frequency on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sector -0.242 -0.250 -0.241 -0.293 -0.442 -0.312
(textiles=1) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.215) (0.272) (0.218)
Firm Age -0.0109*** -0.0111** -0.0109*** -0.00988** -0.00882** -0.0107***
(0.00413) (0.00450) (0.00411) (0.00420) (0.00435) (0.00398)
Foreign owned 0.00423 -0.0417 -0.0193 -0.0169 -0.239 -0.00757
(yes=1) (0.215) (0.183) (0.175) (0.203) (0.307) (0.176)
Exporter -0.0183 -0.0184 -0.00348 -0.0328 0.0725 -0.0486
(yes=1) (0.268) (0.284) (0.273) (0.293) (0.268) (0.265)
Governmnent -0.374* -0.375* -0.370* -0.400* -0.618** -0.410**
supplier (yes=1) (0.196) (0.195) (0.195) (0.205) (0.260) (0.196)
Initial ￿rm size 0.109 0.117 0.111 0.122 0.140 0.129*













Interaction age -0.00268 -0.000767 -0.00295 -0.0148** -0.00774** -0.00454
Bribe features (0.00485) (0.00408) (0.00519) (0.00592) (0.00386) (0.00595)
Constant 0.318 0.285 0.297 0.264 0.295 0.281
(0.280) (0.276) (0.276) (0.269) (0.336) (0.273)
Observations 83 83 83 80 69 83
R2 0.177 0.189 0.186 0.205 0.241 0.207
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in brackets
23